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Abstract
In this article I take issues with some Eurocentric limits of the two contradictions of 
capital: capital/labour and capital/nature. These limits are exposed by elaborating on 
two theoretical insights from researches in critical race studies and indigenous political 
ecologies: respectively thingification and uncommon. These insights produce a tension between 
colonialism and capitalism, which calls for a post-Eurocentric process of concept formation. 
This reconceptualization of capital is pursued through the notion of muri, which the Japanese 
thinker Uno Kōzō deployed to designate a bold non-western pathway to reading Capital. The 
article elaborates and formulates three conceptual and terminological landmarks to unthinking 
capital for a global social theory.
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‘Many errors,’ said Mr. K., ‘arise because those who are talking are not interrupted at all or not 
frequently enough. Thus there easily arises a deceptive whole, which since it is whole, which 
no one can deny, also appears to be true in its individual parts, although in fact they are only 
true as parts of the whole.’ (On Systems, Brecht, 2001: 93)
Introduction
Does capital remain a central category of sociological thinking after the crisis of legiti-
macy of western understanding of the world and its unilateral, parochial inability to 
come to terms with global, colonial and imperial pasts? This heuristic question uncovers 
a profound fallacy that current social theory inherited from classical sociology: they both 
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neglect the colonial formation of capital from an epistemological, rather than from a 
historical point of view. On the one hand, the political economy of slavery, resources 
extraction, land grabbing, plantation system, racial hierarchization of global workforce, 
long-distance trade monopolies, military imperialism are all adduced to explain capital-
ism and the forces behind its global pervasiveness (Frank and Gills, 1990; Quijano, 
2007). On the other hand, in spite of this narrative and explanatory relevance, social 
theory shrinks back in front of the ongoing collective effort to globalize and decolonize 
the categorical apparatus deployed to render the significance of these phenomena intel-
ligible, as well as its colonial vocabulary and Eurocentric biases visible (Connell, 2015). 
Louis Althusser (1972: 166) extolled that Marx had discovered an entire continent: the 
continent of History. Unfortunately, no territorial discovery by European Man came 
without colonization. Franz Fanon (2004: 15) revealed that ‘the colonial subject is a man 
penned in; apartheid is but one method of compartmentalizing the colonial world. The 
first thing the colonial subject learns is to remain in his place and not overstep its limits.’ 
In the epistemic territory of social thought, the reiteration of the western canon with its 
fundamental categories is instrumental in confining colonial subjecthood together with 
its counter-hegemonic standpoints within the boundaries of an epistemological apart-
heid. To preserve the colonizer’s privileges in the realm of the production of knowledge, 
conceptual boundaries are tightly patrolled: what refuses to conform to dominant social 
thought, exceeding its horizons and questioning its authority, is rejected beyond the bor-
ders of concept formation; its theoretical constituency flattened with the compliant tone 
of paternalism or tinged with the caricatural palette of exoticism. In what follows, 
instead, I expose some of the limits inherent in the Eurocentric formation of Marx’s con-
cept of capital and bring into consideration some radical counter-hegemonic insights 
about slavery and indigeneity in order to elaborate and finally formulate three conceptual 
and terminological landmarks to unthinking Capital.
Marx relentlessly affirmed that capital is not a thing; capital is a social relation. As 
such, it points to a twofold constitutive outside: ‘labour as not capital’ and ‘nature as not 
capital’. For this reason, slavery and indigeneity, as I shall argue, are necessary to de-
centre and reformulate the two entangled contradictions of capital: capital/labour and 
capital/nature. But while the capital/labour contradiction is central in Marx’s Capital, the 
capital/nature contradiction is a more recent theoretical advancement, prompted by 
growing lato sensu ecological preoccupations (Foster, 2000; O’Connor, 1988).1 Because 
of this syncopated genealogy, the ‘second’ contradiction has been first posited as a new 
category from the hints of its presence in Capital, and then lifted from its subordination 
to the ‘first’ contradiction. To contemporary social theory, the two contradictions express 
altogether Marx’s ‘trinity formula’ capital–labour–land.2 Enrique Leff (1992: 110, 
emphases added) elucidates that:
Capital, as a theory of the capitalist mode of production, is based upon the contradiction 
between labour and capital inasmuch as capital exploits the worker, who produces more value 
in a work-day than he or she receives in the form of a salary for the reproduction of his or her 
labourpower. This basic principle of contradiction is reproduced in the realization process of 
the merchandise as a crisis of overproduction and underconsumption. The ‘second contradiction’ 
appears as the self-destruction of capital’s conditions of production – labourpower, space and 
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environment – and the self-production of resource scarcity and limited capital accumulation, 
thus generating an underproduction crisis. Marx perceived this contradiction this way: the 
productive forces generated by the crisis of capital combine in such a way as to exhaust the 
natural force of man and nature.
Bringing slavery and indigeneity back into the process of concept formation of capital as 
a social relation provides current social thought with a viable path to tackle specific theo-
retical inadequacies associated with either exploitation of labour, or self-destruction of 
value, or self-production of scarcity. But in front of Marx’s Capital, the effort to con-
struct a global and post-Eurocentric social theory looks tied to two horses pulling in 
opposite directions. On the heterogeneous ‘post-Marxist’ or ‘neo-Marxist’ side, new his-
tories and retrieved evidences that dare to destabilize fundamental Marxian tenets are 
purged from the uncanny elements they promise to install in the sociological imagina-
tion. So, for instance, issues of race and ethnicity are systematically downplayed to be 
eventually domesticated as epiphenomena of the underlying transformations in class 
relations (Pradella, 2014); analogously, the destruction of nature is translated into soil 
defertilization, peasantry pauperization, dispossession and overexploitation of natural 
resources typical of the passage from formal to real subsumption (Bernstein, 2000; 
Borras and Franco, 2012; Smith, 2007). On the non-Marxist side of radical race and 
indigenous studies, conversely, the downplaying of race and nature in theories of colo-
nial and postcolonial capitalist development is responsible for a more or less declared 
renunciation to rethink the conceptual core of the notion of capital.3 This renunciation is 
based on the presumption that capital enjoys a rigid conceptual integrity in se, making it 
a theoretical Moloch instrumental to covering the all-encompassing racial domain of 
white supremacy with a socio-economic livery (Davies, 2007; Mills, 2003); or, other-
wise, this renunciation is motivated with the equally reasonable scepticism in front of the 
academic habit of conceiving the devastation of nature and the annihilation of indige-
nous understandings of nature by relying exclusively on the alien colonial vocabulary of 
the western social sciences (Blaser, 2014; Hale, 2006).
I design a different pathway out of this impasse. It consists in an intertwined reading 
of Bhambra’s connected sociologies and de Sousa-Santos’ diatopic hermeneutics 
(Bhambra, 2014; De Sousa Santos, 2007). The pathway so conceived aims at informing, 
deforming and transforming the concept of capital by disclosing its significance to coun-
ter-hegemonic narratives and notions that solicit the elaboration of more adequate con-
ceptual and terminological landmarks, whose cross-cultural semantics exceeds the 
theoretical archive of the western social sciences. This strategy of concept formation in 
global social theory is part and parcel of the theoretical approach I define ‘teratologic’ 
(Ascione, 2016: 1–27). My argument is articulated in three parts. The first part addresses 
some of the Eurocentric constraints that the capital/labour contradiction inherits from the 
epistemological disavowal of slavery; these constraints are explored by means of the 
tension between the commodification of labour and the thingification of personhood. 
The second part addresses some of the Eurocentric constraints that the capital/nature 
contradiction inherits from the epistemological disavowal of indigeneity; these con-
straints are explored by means of the tension between the destruction of the common and 
the emergence of the uncommon. Drawing on these decolonizing interventions, the third 
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section deploys the concept of muri, by which the post-Second World War Japanese 
thinker Uno Kōzō read Marx’s Capital beyond its Eurocentric horizon, to conceptualize 
the impossibility of the logic capital to fully unfold according to its own rationale. The 
article concludes formulating three entangled landmarks to unthinking Capital, each one 
corresponding to one of these three parts, and suggests mobilizing them to re-conceptu-
alize capital and capitalist destruction, respectively beyond accumulation and the dichot-
omy ‘capitalist versus non-capitalist relations’.
Slavery and the ‘First’ Contradiction
To gauge with how many enslaved bodies would have survived each transoceanic depor-
tation from Africa and South Asia across the Pacific, the Indian and the Atlantic routes 
was a usual economic practice for slave-traders (Chatterjee and Eaton, 2006; Shilliam, 
2015b; Williams, 1994). Employers of enslaved people concretely modelled their meas-
ure for profit upon an average calculation of the nutritional threshold (and other associ-
ated expenditures) demarcating the necropolitical threshold between the life and death of 
the slave (Levy, 2014).4 This practice proved so efficient for slaveholders that during the 
1850s two of them, Hughes and Fitzhugh, among the early founding fathers of US soci-
ology, came to argue that slavery was certainly more convenient, remunerative and spe-
cifically ‘modern’ than free labour, which conversely was considered the hallmark of 
capitalist modernity by their coeval European social theorists (Magubane, 2016). But in 
spite of the substantial centrality of slavery in the political economy of colonialism, 
social theory has inherited (and reproduces) from classical sociology a rooted epistemo-
logical disavowal of slavery. This disavowal is now a site of contestation for those who 
engage with rethinking modernity from the standpoint of its racial foundations (Bhambra, 
2016; Rebaka, 2010; Robinson, 2001). Marx, James Edward Ford III (2011: 24) recalls, 
‘refers to the overworked Negro and to how “the consumption of his life in seven years 
of labour, became a factor in a calculated and calculating system” rather than an extraor-
dinary occurrence’. Nonetheless, Marx relegated the figure of the slave to a narrow his-
torical and theoretical locus within the analytical architecture of Capital.
The epistemological disavowal of slavery against its analytical and historical rele-
vance is a by-product of Marx’s own method. Marx’s method aimed at establishing what 
the main tendencies in society were, in order to accord priority to the salient traits of 
industrial society (McQuarie, 1978; Wardell, 1979). Paul Sweezy (1970: 16–17) clarifies 
that:
[Marx] had expressed the same judgment in the Manifesto: ‘Society as a whole is more and 
more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes facing each other – 
bourgeoisie and proletariat.’ This relation must form the center of investigation [in Capital]. 
‘All social relations except that between capital and labour must be provisionally assumed 
away, to be reintroduced, one at a time, only at a later stage of analysis.’
Marx shared with classical political economy the clear-cutting dichotomy between ‘free’ 
and ‘unfree’ labour. Simply put, the slave is sold to the slaveholder as an all-encompassing 
property, while the wage worker is ‘free’ to sell his workforce for a limited amount of 
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time.5 This dichotomy, encapsulated in the teleology of the succession of the forms of 
labour from slavery, to serfdom, to wage, legitimized two Eurocentric, historicist and 
racist assumptions that Marx shared with many of his contemporaries. The first assump-
tion consists in the belief that being their entire existence a commodified good, slaves 
have no agency; as such, they are worse positioned than the peasantry and even the 
lumpenproletariat in front of capital, as historical subjecthood candidate to be the anti-
thetical opposite to the capitalist class in the dialectics between capital and labour. The 
second is that, historically, slavery was a residual form of labour, since the process of 
commodification of labour would have led to the full proletarization of global workforce 
and the demise of unfree labour.6
The misleading consequences of these assumptions have been questioned by the two 
connected decolonizing readings of Marx’s own writings elaborated by Ford on Capital 
and by Robbie Shilliam on the Manifesto. Marx, they agree, did not expel slavery from 
the ‘first’ contradiction of capital. Rather he transmuted the slave into the recessive 
underside of the proletarian. The epistemological disavowal of slavery represents the 
foundational act of forceful silencing that enables the appearance of the western white 
male wage worker on the stage of modern history, and endows this historical figure with 
the role of outpost of the struggle of humanity for its emancipation from the chains of the 
capitalist mode of production. But the chains that Marx elevated to metaphorical simu-
lacrum of the captivity of the wage workers are in fact forged in the theoretical smithery 
of what Shilliam names the ‘slave analogy’. Shilliam (2015a) shows that the condition of 
slavery provided Marx and Engels with an ineludible analytical trope since the time of 
their early concern with ‘scientifically’ unfolding the hidden logic of capital.7 The 
Manifesto could not have denounced exploitation suffered by European proletarians 
without Marx and Engels’ continuous reference to the condition of slavery in antiquity 
and, a fortiori, without the enslaved Africans and the role their descendants played in the 
history of the Americas.8
The narrative marginalization of the slave in the Manifesto is the logical pre-condition 
for the epistemological disavowal of slavery in Capital. In the Manifesto, the analogy 
between class exploitation in European factories and the command over personhood of 
the slave in the plantations was the most powerful rhetorical tool to mobilize workers dur-
ing the 1848 Parisian riots. In fact, the slave is palpable in the way Marx and Engels 
denounce the most detrimental and humiliating aspects of the dehumanizing conditions of 
the proletarian. In Capital, instead, Marx is more concerned with giving formal coherence 
to the ‘scientific’ analysis of the capitalist mode of production; therefore he encodes his 
theory into a nomothetic formalism that, while setting the interpretative frame for his nar-
rative of exploitation and struggles, at the same time confines the recessive slave in both 
Capital’s prose and style. This is why Derrida’s hermeneutical method serves Ford’s pur-
pose to rescue ‘the slave’ from the textual supplements, footnotes, excised notes and 
appendices of Capital, where Marx had relegated her/him. In the middle passage between 
the Manifesto and Capital, Marx ‘whitened’ the alleged universal logic of capital through 
a process of concept formation, which progressively sank its black foundations.9 Within 
the Eurocentric and colonial episteme to which Marx belonged, this strategy was adequate 
to ground the ‘iron laws of history’ on the terrain of an objective theoretical construction, 
ethnocentrically meaningful within the ruling colonial regime of knowledge validation.
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Conversely, acknowledging the way racial biases crystallize in the concept of capital 
and simultaneously dissolve their whiteness into method, calls for a severe critique of the 
labour-value theory. It suggests changing the terms of the capital/labour relation, by 
bringing into consideration the silenced enslaved Black African as the crucial site for any 
attempt to conceive social forms of labour coercion in the modern world. The unmuted 
slave tells histories of humiliation but also tales of liberation and redemption (rather than 
exploitation and emancipation) of lived enslaved humans (Shilliam, 2012). As far as 
slavery is concerned, it places its epistemological constituency into the core of the ‘first’ 
contradiction. In fact, analogy marks an epistemological difference from the mere meta-
phor, inasmuch as it does not convey a form of representation of a historical and social 
condition. Rather it refers to multiple ways of articulating a common underlying reality. 
When the language of the analogy is suspended, there emerges a strident dissonance 
between the white Eurocentric theoretical construction of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion and the colonial and postcolonial worldly (dis)order experienced globally by racial-
ized subjects. This dissonance does not pertain to an ontological irreconcilability, rather 
to the racial articulation of the epistemological separation and hierarchization between 
the figure of the slave and the figure of the wage worker. For this reason whereas Marx 
saw the commodification of labour in industrial society as privileged analytical locus, 
Aimé Cesaire focused his own understanding of modern capitalism on slavery and its 
long-term social consequences:
The core phenomenon to be addressed is not so much the alienation of the worker from the 
fruits of his/her labour power but rather, as Aimé Césaire puts it, the ‘thingification’ 
(chosification in French) of personhood through enslavement and its lasting racial legacies. In 
other words, while the industrial factory system alienates labour power (and its results) from 
the labourer via the technology of waged work, plantation slavery alienates the entire body and 
labour power of the person via the technology of racialization. (Shilliam, 2015a: 197)
Thinking from, with and through the colonial Caribbean, Cesaire first opposed thingi-
fication to commodification, in his 1955 Discourse on Colonialism (Cesaire, 2007). 
By this term, Cesaire (2007) aimed at signifying the enduring violence involved in 
‘the effect of colonialism upon the personhood of the colonized’. For ‘colonialism did 
more than just exploit labour: it “emptied” entire peoples of their culture’ (Shilliam, 
2012: 594). Under this respect, the racialized enslaved African was not only the nec-
essary anthropological figure that endowed the ideological toolkit of the first 
Portuguese and Spanish colonizers with the cultural coordinates to encode the subju-
gation and extermination of indigenous peoples wherever they encountered them, to 
paraphrase Franz Fanon (Pagden, 1986).10 Achille Mbembe (2015) argues for the 
global relevance of thingification in the contemporary postcolonial world too: thingi-
fication is the logical premise and the primal force of global colonial capitalism as a 
whole. Capitalism, paradoxically, implements a very detrimental form of equality, 
which stands as the underside of the equality professed by the Enlightenment: humans 
as such, and not only their commodified workforce for a limited amount of time per 
day, can be legitimately transformed into things of reproduction, production and 
exchange.
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Reconfiguring the ‘first’ contradiction through the conceptual and terminological lens 
of thingification calls for de-centring exploitation and violence from the strict connection 
between performed work and remuneration, to incorporate them into the multilayered 
entangled dimensions that are essential to govern the relation between existence and the 
modes of social production, reproduction and exchange on a worldly level. Fanon acutely 
foresaw the subversive theoretical power of unveiling the salient traits of the socio-eco-
nomic configurations of power through the racial technologies in place in the colonial 
worlds:
The singularity of the colonial context lies in the fact that economic reality, inequality, and 
enormous disparities in lifestyles never manage to mask the human reality. Looking at the 
immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost 
what species, what race one belongs to. In the colonies the economic infrastructure is also a 
superstructure. (Fanon, 2004: 5)
Once the colonial essence of modernity is exposed, the ‘first’ contradiction becomes a 
broader and deeper instance of capital in the global world. It embodies complex and 
shifting combinations of racial technologies of discrimination and control within an 
articulated matrix of forms of social coercion, violence and humiliation. The ‘first’ con-
tradiction refers to the drive of thingification (rather than merely commodification) 
towards the annihilation and mortification of the human (rather than only the accumula-
tion of capital), and the resistance that humans (rather than mainly workers) oppose to 
dehumanization occurring within the concrete transient social tropoi where the biopoli-
tics of thingification materialize.
Indigeneity and the ‘Second’ Contradiction
Thingification concerns fundamental theoretical dimensions of the detrimental effects of 
colonial capitalism upon human life that Marx’s theory of labour-value had underplayed. 
Thus it inherently bridges the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ contradiction. As Escobar (2008: 
93) explains, in fact, the ‘second’ contradiction
brings to the fore the conditions of production, insufficiently theorized by Marx but placed at 
the center of the inquiry by Polanyi. A condition of production is defined as those factors that 
are not produced as commodities, that is, according to the law of value, even if they are treated 
as such; this includes those aspects that Polanyi called ‘fictitious commodities’, such as land 
(nature), labour (human life), space and many general and communal conditions of production.
Capital is inhabited by the idiosyncratic co-existence of two seemingly contradictory 
assertions: ‘labour is the father of wealth while land is its mother’ and ‘the physical prop-
erties of commodities have nothing to do with their physical nature’ (Marx cit. in Coronil, 
2000: 91). It follows that the materiality of commodities is inseparable from their capac-
ity to produce and represent wealth: being the basic unit of wealth in capitalism, com-
modity-form embodies both its natural form and its value-form. This would suffice to 
recognize that the social groups involved in the production of wealth cannot be circum-
scribed to those involved in the dialectics capital-labour (Coronil, 2000). For the 
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production of subjecthood associated with the dynamics of capitalist development is 
extended to considering land as part of the dialectics of capital, so that social groups 
directly affected by the processes of dispossession, extraction, production and resistance 
about their own land in the colonies have to be relocated into the world historical con-
struction of global colonial capitalism since its onset.11 But this way of sociologically 
conceptualizing the ‘second’ contradiction finds its limitation in the fact that even though 
nature is not reduced to a factor of production through the metonymic concept of land, 
indigenous communities are partly deprived of their own subjecthood. They are con-
ceived mainly as an ethnic, or alternatively pre-modern or non-modern, articulation of 
the peasantry. Indigeneity, that refers synthetically to vastly heterogeneous peoples, his-
tories and struggles, would thus manifest limitedly to the tactic resistance opposed by 
indigenous communities to environmental devastation. In Marxian terms, indigeneity 
would connote the effort to preserve alternative use-values of which indigenous social 
organizations are bearers; as if the resistances against the dispossession of the commons 
embodied by indigeneity would be entirely determined by the power of capital as such to 
constantly producing social differences.
Conversely, taking seriously the potential of the irruption of indigenous subjecthood 
in the ‘second’ contradiction turns out to be a broader theoretical issue. It prefigures a 
detour from what exceeds the dialectics capital/nature to the borders of the logic of capi-
tal. For the way indigenous communities tell their own histories about the destruction of 
nature, as well as the way they map the devastation of the territories they inhabit or even 
the detrimental effects of colonialism and capitalism over non-human beings that co-
habit those same territories, is at odds with existing categories of sociological thinking 
(Harding, 2011; Selin, 2003).12 In this regard, Marisol De La Cadena (2015b: 3) recalls 
that colonization consisted not only in ecological devastation; rather in the annihilation 
of other worldviews about nature that did not conform with that of the colonizers: ‘[a] 
war waged against world-making practices that ignore the separation of entities into 
nature and culture – and the resistance to that war’. De La Cadena (2015b: 3) maintains 
that the indigenous resistance to annihilation is never extinguished, as its persistence 
over centuries proves that it exceeds destruction. Indigeneity, for her, refers to:
more-than-human assemblages, both in the usual sense (i.e., that they may include humans and 
nonhumans), and in the sense that these categories (human and nonhuman, and therefore 
species) are also inadequate to grasp such compositions, which as said above, may not become 
through these categories.
In order to clarify the relevance of this point for contemporary social theory, I use De La 
Cadena’s argument as a counterpunctual intervention that exposes some limits of socio-
logical thinking.
In their path-breaking sociological conceptualization of commensuration, Espeland 
and Stevens (1998) convincingly describe the act of commensuration as an enduring 
form of social power in the modern world, as well as the fundamental grammar of 
Capital. For Marx, they remark, capital manifests in the first instance as a drive towards 
making what exists as concrete social differences (qualities) commensurable through 
value, money and abstract labour (quantities). For this reason, they describe radical 
social resistances in terms of incommensurabilities:
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defining something as incommensurate is a special form of valuing. Incommensurables 
preclude trade-offs. An incommensurable category encompasses things that are defined as 
socially unique in a specific way. They are not to be expressed in terms of some other category 
of value. (Espeland and Stevens, 1998: 326)
For them the environmental struggles of the Native American Yavapai people settled 
in Arizona is exemplificative of this social form of resistance. When the Yavapai’s 
ancestral land was threatened by the project of a dam, the Yavapai people opposed the 
project and declared their land incommensurable against state and corporate logic:
The rational decision models used by bureaucrats to evaluate the proposed dam required that 
the various components of the decision be made commensurate, including the cost and 
consequences associated with the forced resettlement of the Yavapai community. This way of 
representing Yavapai interests and expressing the value of their land was a contradiction of 
those values and of Yavapai identity. (Espeland and Stevens, 1998: 327)
De La Cadena, similarly, takes as an example the environmental conflict in the 
northern Andean region of Peru. Here the project of a dam raises the resistance of 
the indigenous community inhabiting the lagoon, which would exsiccate because of 
the dam. De La Cadena (2015b: 6) maintains that ‘refusing to sell may also refuse the 
transformation of the entities into units of nature or the environment, for they are part 
of each other’. Differently from Espeland and Stevens, she emphasizes that indigenous 
people are not simply affirming that their land is incommensurable. Theirs is not a 
tactical response in the dialectics with capital, grounded in a traditional set of beliefs 
that does not allow for quantifying nature.13 Instead, indigenous resistance is making 
visible a deeper epistemological awareness: the relation between capital and colonial-
ism (and their agents), on the one hand, and indigeneity (and they as agent) on the 
other hand, irreversibly creates a new social reality that is neither entirely intelligible 
as commensurability that precedes the dispossession of a common, nor as the defence 
of nature as a sentient being; it exceeds both. This is evident when De La Cadena 
(2015b: 6) registers the voice of an iconic indigenous peasant woman that is one among 
the so-called guardians of the lagoon:
The woman’s refusal would thus enact locally an ecologized nature of interdependent entities 
that simultaneously coincides, differs, and even exceeds – also because it includes humans – the 
object that the state, the mining corporation, and environmentalists seek to translate into 
resources, whether for exploitation or to be defended.
The resistance to environmental devastation from the perspective of indigeneity is not 
limited to an opposition about the uses of nature. It is not entirely intelligible as the strug-
gle to defend the common against capital, even and importantly because it exceeds the 
grammar of Capital. It shows that the power that capital holds to reduce social realities 
to its own logic depends also on to what extent the relational nature of capital itself is 
concealed: being a social relation involving indigenous resistance, the capital/nature 
contradiction is deformed by indigeneity as far as the relation involving indigenous ter-
ritory is concerned.
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Moreover, what exceeds the grammar of Capital is not a dialectical synthesis that 
simply posits a new social reality that can be made once again transparent to social 
theory by means of the categories of value, common or commodification; it is rather a 
negative limit to knowledge: not a shared understanding, but the sharable awareness 
of a limit to understanding. De La Cadena (2015a: 63) designates the epistemological 
territory created by what resists destruction while simultaneously exceeding it, as the 
uncommon:
Differences that appeared through what we shared were intriguingly obvious, for they were part 
of our similarities as well. But there was also a lot that made us uncommon to each other and 
that could not be explained through the analytics of race, ethnicity, and class; these were 
markers that the Turpos and I could talk about, sometimes in agreement and other times in 
disagreement. Instead, what made us mutually uncommon also exceeded our comprehension of 
each other; the difference thus presented was also radical to both of us.14
The uncommon that emerges from the tension between indigeneity and the ‘second’ 
contradiction invites us to relocate conflicting understandings of nature into a 
more precarious, transient understanding of difference. An understanding that invokes 
less the ontological presence of alternative sets of assumptions about the world and 
more the relational contingent co-formation of knowledges about and within the 
world:15
What emerges through it is not a ‘mix’ of nature and human. Being composed as humans with 
nature – if we maintain these categories of being – makes each more. Entities emerge as 
materially specific to (and with!) the relation that inherently connects them. (De La Cadena, 
2015b: 8, emphasis added)
Indigeneity interrupts the dialectics between capital and nature, to set the uncommon as 
a limit to what can be made fully transparent to western rationality through its own con-
ceptual archive.
The (Un)Thinkable Logic of Capital
As much as indigeneity places its epistemological constituency into the ‘second’ contra-
diction, slavery places its epistemological constituency into the ‘first’ contradiction. 
Their interplay calls for disclosing Marx’s trinity formula capital–labour–land to the 
relation it entails with what is ‘not capital’. Uno Kōzō’s post-Second World War analysis 
of the agrarian question in Japan offers a methodological route along this path.16 Uno 
questioned the assumption of the contradictory nature of the relation between capitalist 
social relations and pre-existing non-capitalist social relations. Non-capitalist social rela-
tions were not always an impediment for capitalist development; in Marxian terms, they 
were not necessarily the notorious limits (not capital) that capital itself creates, which 
appear as barriers to overcome. Rather, what is considered ‘not capital’ can be analyti-
cally disarticulated into what opposes resistance to capital and what, instead, actively 
facilitates it:
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The rural village structure which had formed the social basis of the ancien régime was thus 
seemingly dismantled through violence, yet at the same time, this was also in fact an expression 
of the planned balancing and harmonization of capitalist production …. the pastures, expanded 
to accommodate the goal of wool exports, offered raw materials to the domestic wool industry, 
and the peasantry, expelled from the land in precisely the same process, became the labouring 
proletariat, the force which spurred on the capitalist industrialization of the wool and other 
medieval industries, which were at that point still being managed and administered on the level of 
simple handicrafts. Thus the emerging proletariat was itself used as a powerful force of pressure 
in order to forcibly subordinate the existing artisans to capital. (Uno in Walker, 2012: 18)
Just as Quijano provoked a conceptual shift from the ‘colonial system’ to ‘coloniality’, 
Uno prefigured the possibility to not thinking in terms of the ‘feudal system’, but rather 
in terms of ‘feudality’ (hôkensei). Uno explains that:
the apparent existence of feudal relations in the countryside was not an indication that the actual 
full-blown feudal system remained on a partial basis, or that these relations were merely 
atrophied ‘remnants’ but rather it indicated something much more complex: feudal relations or 
feudal ‘sentiments’ were ‘maintained precisely as a sacrifice that enabled Japanese capitalism 
to develop without resolving the problems it itself posited’. (Walker, 2012: 29)
Non-capitalist relations provide the enabling conditions of possibility for the logic of 
capital to objectify itself: capital and non-capital reciprocally connect in a complex mul-
tilayered relationship of mutual necessity but reciprocal non-coincidence; yet this pro-
cess remains always incomplete. The transformative violence of capitalism pertains 
co-extensively and originally to a violence that belongs also to the non-capitalist social 
relations themselves. It follows that the interactions, conflicts and negotiations between 
existing social relations and capital are not adequately conceived in terms of alien, mutu-
ally exclusive or ontologically irreconcilable historical formations.
But then the analytical trope of the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of 
production (as we know it) morphs from a theoretical problematique into a problematic 
barrier for sociologically conceptualizing the relation between capitalist and non-capital-
ist social relations beyond a teleological mindset. Why? Marx was unequivocal about the 
fact that:
it would be impractical and wrong to arrange the economic categories in the order in which they 
were the determining factors in the course of history. Their order of sequence is rather 
determined by the relation which they bear to each other in modern bourgeois society, and 
which is the exact opposite of what seems to be their natural order or the order of their historical 
development. (Marx in Sweezy, 1970: 16)
Nonetheless, whereas Marx thought that once the transition to the capitalist mode of 
production has occurred capitalist social relations irreversibly replace pre-existing social 
relations forever, Uno thought otherwise: capital and non-capital are inherently rela-
tional, co-constitutive, co-extensive and simultaneous.17 As well as De La Cadena does, 
Uno also places a strong theoretical emphasis on the generative nature of relations. 
Walker figures out Uno’s understanding:
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The ‘leap’ or ‘inversion’ is precisely what creates the two sides. By inverting, reversing, 
leaping, or ‘passing through,’ a planar surface or single topological field in extension is 
retroactively split into two, made to appear double, so that there becomes ‘this side’ and ‘that 
side,’ so that the historical process appears to be grounded on a set of uneven substances that 
pre-exist the moment when they are revealed. But prior to the moment of traversal, when a 
boundary or limit emerges that must be ‘passed through,’ the boundary or limit would merely 
be located as one moment of a single planar horizon, not something that marks the gap between 
two sides. (Walker, 2012: 30)
But even whereas one accepts that, in history, capitalist and non-capitalist relations recip-
rocally interpellate so that it becomes adequate to sociologically conceptualize them by 
giving priority to relations over formed entities, a problem remains: how to conceive 
simultaneously capital as a social relation that cannot pre-exist historically the connection 
it entails with what is external to it, on the one hand, and the logic of capital that, being 
capital’s own inner integral rationality, has to necessarily pre-exist its own historical 
appearance, on the other hand. Uno answers this heuristic question affirming that:
the starting-point of the systematic logic of political economy must always ‘presuppose’ 
(voraussetzen) something purely irrational as the ground of the rationality of the historical 
process, which will then be ‘retrojected’ back onto the moment of origin in order to once again 
‘presuppose’ it as rational … the schema of capital must necessarily pre-exist its historical 
appearance. (Walker, 2012: 29, emphases in original)
Uno conceptualizes this impossibility as a nihil of reason, a negative limit overlapping 
with the epistemological territory of the uncommon. But Uno entrusts the semantic des-
ignation of this uncommon to the Japanese word muri. Muri means impossibility but also 
inefficiency and waste, thereby evoking both a limit to theorization of capital and its 
underside of irrecoverable loss.
As Walker notes, Uno ‘makes a kind of wager on the possibility of a certain excessive 
formalism as the only means available to us to “express” the abstraction of the circuit 
process of capital’ (Walker, 2012: 17, emphasis in original). Uno’s critique of Marx’s 
logic of capital takes place at the abstract level of the schema of realization. Here the 
concept of muri deforms the crucial Marxian notion of unproductive consumption.18 For 
Marx, unproductive consumption is consumption that is not oriented towards investment 
for profit by capitalists; in a broader sense, consumption that does not culminate in the 
reproduction of the means of production. While logically the self-valorization of capital 
presupposes the abstraction of a society made only of two antagonist classes, with the 
owners of the means of production orienting their consumption to investment, and the 
workers consuming for their subsistence, historically – Marx concedes – the process of 
accumulation cannot exist if the schema of realization does not include the economic 
inefficiency and waste represented conceptually by unproductive consumption. Marx 
justified this circumstance by introducing an ad hoc hypothesis: a temporary status of 
exception.19 But both historically and logically, this ad hoc hypothesis has proven a con-
dition that is ineliminable and original rather than conjunctural and ancillary. Thus, the 
Marxian category of unproductive consumption formed a broad locus of further theoreti-
cal developments in social thought, ranging from Thorstein Veblen’s conspicuous 
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consumption to Henryk Grossman or Tony Cliff’s theories of the centrality of war in 
capitalism (see Cliff, 2003 [1957]; Grossmann, 1992 [1929]; Veblen, 2005 [1902]). As 
well as ‘labour’ is not reducible to wage because it also involves thingification of person-
hood, and ‘nature’ is not reducible to land as a factor of production because it involves 
the annihilation of other understandings of nature, the overall outcome of several socio-
logical understandings of unproductive consumption is that destruction and waste are not 
reducible to the significance it enjoys in Marxian political economy. For conspicuous 
consumption of capital is not a zero-sum game where ‘the unproductive consumption of 
capital replaces it on one side, annihilates it on the other’ (Marx, 1993: 751); rather the 
habit of consuming luxury goods involves both material waste, social hierarchization, 
display of power and cultural hegemony.20 And war is not reducible to a Keynesian vari-
able where the production of the means of production couples with the production of the 
means of destruction, because it means both the destruction of value and the violent 
annihilation of the human.21
Muri exceeds unproductive consumption inasmuch as it offers a sociological concep-
tualization for those aspects of capitalist destruction that are not strictly confined within 
the destruction of value created by capital itself. Thinking with muri detaches destruction 
from the self-valorization of capital and its accumulation. It makes possible to rethink 
destruction with a relative theoretical autonomy from accumulation, thereby creating the 
conceptual locus of destruction per se. Destruction per se is not the side-effect of accu-
mulation, because it displaces the alleged rationality of the self-contained logic of capital 
either from self-valorization through creative destruction aimed at re-establishing profit-
ability, or from the self-destruction of its own material base to induce scarcity. Thus, 
destruction is not reducible to an ontological attribute of capital in se. Destruction per se 
connotes the reiterate co-formation of capital as a social relation that, for it is per se and 
not in se, it is actively co-formed by what is not capital. It follows that the logic of capital 
is unthinkable as fully rational in terms of accumulation, when its alleged rationality is 
subverted by the irrational drive to destruction per se. When launched beyond the episte-
mological barriers surrounding the theoretical core of Capital, Marx’s motto 
‘Accumulation for accumulation’s sake, production for production’s sake!’ resonates 
with a powerful echo that Eurocentrism had silenced: Destruction for destruction’s sake!
Conclusion
Three conceptual and terminological landmarks to unthinking Capital have been elabo-
rated so far: (1) the commodification of labour can be rethought in terms of the thingifi-
cation of the human and humiliation of personhood; thingification is a condition of 
possibility of global colonial capitalist modernity as a whole rather than being circum-
scribed to the forms of ‘unfree’ labour; (2) the destruction of nature involves the annihi-
lation of alternative understandings of nature. But the radical resistance these alternative 
understandings enact interrupts the grammar of Capital and displaces it into an uncom-
mon epistemological territory: neither shared by, nor reducible to, one of the two sides of 
the colonial relation; (3) capital as a social relation does not connote any historical entity 
called ‘capital’; rather it denotes the irrational dimension of violence and destruction per 
se that capital as social relation entails across different social formations. Whereas Marx 
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intended the movement from the concrete to the abstract in terms of temporary reduction 
ad unum of the conceptual complexity adequate to describe capital, the process of con-
cept formation here proposed consists in complexifying the theoretical and semantic 
territory of capital, solicited by new decolonizing insights that offer alternative but not 
mutually exclusive views on the same processes that the concept of capital was originally 
designed to grasp. Thingification, uncommon and muri augment the heuristic power of 
the trinity formula but at the same time diminish the alleged ‘rationality’ of the logic of 
capital whereas it remains connoted prevalently in terms of accumulation. Capital–land–
labour can be re-conceptualized with a hypostatic formula which makes explicit 
what had been disavowed: capital/destruction per se–labour/slavery–land/indigeneity. 
Whereas Marx understood hypostatization as the fallacy of reification of abstract notions, 
here hypostasis refers to the possibility to re-articulate in multiplex and heterogeneous 
forms the missing, silenced, hidden and removed epistemological dimensions of Capital. 
In this sense, capital as a social relation can be disclosed to a conception that shifts from 
its presumed integrity towards a plural understanding of the scattered, multiform ways 
through which the relations of violent annihilation and irreversible destruction recipro-
cally interpellate across different societal organizations, historical contexts, networks 
and configurations of knowledge.
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Notes
 1. The ongoing debate on Anthropocene in the social sciences inherits these preoccupations. 
It transposes the analysis of the modern world on the broader level of an in fieri geological 
frame where the rise and globalization of the capitalist mode of production, particularly with 
industrialization, is theoretically associated with the onset of a new era in the history of the 
planet (Capitalochene), characterized by irreversible processes of ecological devastation. See 
the contributions to Moore (2016).
 2. In book III of Capital Marx (1995: 555) writes: ‘[c]apital, land, labour! However, capital is 
not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical 
formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social 
character.’ And then he specifies that land is transformed into value through labour according 
to the fertility of the soil, since ‘alongside of this we have the land, inorganic nature as such, 
rudis indigestaque moles, [“A rude and undigested mass”, Ovid, Metamorphoses, Book I, 7. 
— Ed] in all its primeval wildness. Value is labour. Therefore surplus-value cannot be earth’ 
(1995: 556).
 3. Stuart Hall (2002: 258, emphases in original) admitted that ‘[w]hat has resulted from the aban-
donment of this deterministic economism has been, not alternative ways of thinking questions 
about the economic relations and their effects, as the “condition of existence” of other prac-
tices, inserting them into a “decentred” or dislocated way into our explanatory paradigms. But 
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instead a massive, gigantic and eloquent disavowal. As if, since the economic in its broadest 
sense, definitively does not, as it was once supposed to do, “determine” the real movement 
of history “in the last instance”, it does not exist at all!’ Mezzadra (2011: 155) denounces an 
analogous impasse of theory when he alerts that ‘by renouncing to a direct theoretical engage-
ment with capitalism, many scholars working in the fields of cultural and postcolonial studies 
have in a way unconsciously validated the “objectivity” of its “structural” developments and 
laws’.
 4. On the concept of necropolitics see Agamben (1995) and Mbembe (2003). It connotes the 
absolute power over human life that renders sovereignty a pure unilateral expression of the 
dominant social power to postulate and impose both the norm and the state of exception.
 5. The distinction between ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ labour is increasingly discredited in historiogra-
phy. Claims of its conceptual inadequacy have been persistently raised in recent scholarship 
either in global labour histories of pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial worlds (De Vito, 
2013; Van Der Linden, 2008); or in European and Mediterranean histories of labour in the 
Middle Ages (Ehmer and Lis, 2009; Shatzmiller, 1994).
 6. The persistence of slavery in global capitalism has been recurrently analysed under many 
respects. For a recent re-appraisal of this topic, see O’Connell Davidson (2015).
 7. Already before drafting the Manifesto, while in Brussels in 1846–1847, Marx (2001: 94–95) 
affirmed in The Poverty of Philosophy that ‘[d]irect slavery is just as much the pivot of bour-
geois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton 
you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the 
colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-
scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slav-
ery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal 
country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy – the 
complete decay of modern commerce and civilisation. Cause slavery to disappear and you 
will have wiped America off the map of nations. Thus slavery, because it is an economic 
category, has always existed among the institutions of the peoples. Modern nations have been 
able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise 
upon the New World.’
 8. The interest of Marx and Engels with non-western worlds affects their entire theoretical pro-
duction. See Anderson (2016).
 9. Evidences of this theoretical path emerge by bringing into consideration Marx’s notebook V 
in the Gründrisse. See in particular Marx (1993: 493–503).
10. ‘Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere 
they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe’ 
(Fanon, 2004: 235).
11. The connection between the double nature of the commodity-form as Marx presents it since 
the very first pages of Capital and the spatial articulation of global colonial capitalism in its 
historical worldly development has been eloquently elaborated from a critical perspective that 
includes the role played by environmental and rural social movements in Latin America by 
Porto-Gonçalves (2006).
12. Walter Mignolo tackled the issue of indigeneity in terms of ontology and its relation with 
logic and language based on a thoughtful interpretation of Valantine Mudimbe’s path-break-
ing concept of African gnosis. See Mignolo (2000: 313–337).
13. This prejudice, to be sure, is one of the enduring heritages of the Eurocentric narrative of 
modern science that connotes the difference between western rationality and the ‘rest’ in 
terms of the drive towards the quantification of Nature, while global histories of science radi-
cally question this presumed uniqueness. See Joseph (2011).
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14. Mariano and Nazario Turpo have been indigenous leaders engaged in the Andean network of 
environmental struggles, as well as for the recognition of indigenous rights.
15. On this point De La Cadena partly diverges from those theories that define worldviews in 
terms of ontology, where ontology refers to different sets of beliefs. See for instance Descola 
and Pálsson (1996).
16. Uno Kōzō’s opera omnia has been published in the 1970s in 11 volumes. See Uno (1974).
17. Marx makes explicit that the transition to the capitalist mode of production is irreversible 
since his preliminary writings to Capital in the Gründrisse (Marx, 1993: 489–514). Some 
afterthoughts on the cogency of this assumption, instead, emerge only in his very last ethno-
logical writings on non-western societies. See Krader (1974).
18. For a general introduction to the role of unproductive consumption in Marxian political econ-
omy see Becker (1977).
19. In Marx’s words, ‘[b]ut as things actually are, the replacement of capitals invested in pro-
duction depends to a large extent on the consumption capacity of the non-productive classes; 
while the consumption capacity of the workers is restricted partly by the laws governing 
wages and partly by the fact that they are employed at a profit for the capitalist class’ (Marx, 
1992: 530, emphasis added). Elsewhere Marx claims that ‘[t]he capitalist mode of produc-
tion, while on the one hand, enforcing economy in each individual business, on the other 
hand, begets by its anarchical system of competition, the most outrageous squandering of 
labour power and of the social means of production, not to mention the creation of a vast 
number of employments, at present indispensable but in themselves are superfluous’ (Marx, 
1992: 667).
20. As far as conspicuous consumption is concerned, Baudrillard’s critique of consumer society 
beyond the Marxian logic of accumulation remains essential. See Baudrillard (1993).
21. Bukharin (1982 [1920]: 52–53) wrote about destruction in the following terms: ‘a cannon 
cannot be transformed into an element of a new productive cycle; gunpowder explodes into 
thin air and does not reappear during the ensuing cycle … war is accompanied by a “dis-
torted”, regressive, negative character of the reproduction process’. As Callinicos (2009: 
58–63) notes, notwithstanding that both Grossman and Bukharin grasped some key dynam-
ics in the relation between military expenditure, capital accumulation and imperialism, their 
approach was discredited because its validity was tested against its (in)ability to predict the 
mechanisms of the fatal crisis of capitalism.
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